Equilibrium Selection Through Incomplete Information in Coordination Games: An Experimental Study by Cabrales, Antonio et al.
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Abstract We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertainty
about the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models that have been used in many
macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problems of equilibrium indeter-
minacy. In our experiment, each subject receives a noisy signal about the true payoffs.
This game (inspired by the “global” games of Carlsson and van Damme, Economet-
rica, 61, 989–1018, 1993) has a unique strategy profile that survives the iterative
deletion of strictly dominated strategies (thus a unique Nash equilibrium). The equi-
librium outcome coincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome
of the underlying coordination game. In the baseline game, the behavior of the sub-
jects converges to the theoretical prediction after enough experience has been gained.
The data (and the comments) suggest that this behavior can be explained by learning.
To test this hypothesis, we use a different game with incomplete information, related
to a complete information game where learning and prior experiments suggest a dif-
ferent behavior. Indeed, in the second treatment, the behavior did not converge to
equilibrium within 50 periods in some of the sessions. We also run both games under
complete information. The results are sufficiently similar between complete and in-
complete information to suggest that risk-dominance is also an important part of the
explanation.
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1 Introduction
There are many important economic phenomena that can be modeled as coordi-
nation games, that is, games with multiple equilibria. Often, these equilibria are
Pareto-ranked. For example, unemployment or underemployment (Diamond 1982;
Hart 1982; Bryant 1983), currency crises (Obstfeld 1996), and bank runs (Diamond
and Dybvig 1983)1 have all been modeled in this way. Some of the equilibria in
these models look more plausible than others, and policy implications also depend
on which equilibrium most closely represents reality.
But, without further information, it is hard to know what determines which equi-
librium will be observed. In principle, even a sunspot, rather than any fundamental
information, can be the explanation. This is not the way that people involved in these
games usually perceive the situation,2 and theoretically it is not very satisfactory. Fur-
thermore, with multiplicity of equilibria, even comparative statics exercises are not
straightforward (a change of policy parameters could, for example, trigger a change
of equilibrium).
A recent approach to this problem has been to introduce incomplete information
into the model. In this way, a unique equilibrium can arise. This equilibrium is of-
ten the one that was thought to be the most economically plausible. What is perhaps
surprising is that even small departures from complete information (“almost com-
mon knowledge”) can generate unique equilibria, when under common knowledge
there is more than one. This is clear in the e-mail game of Rubinstein (1989).3 Simi-
larly, Carlsson and van Damme (1993) “slightly” perturb the players’ information in
a coordination game.4 This leads to an incomplete information game with a unique
solution by iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. Morris et al. (1995b) and
Kajii and Morris (1997) further explain and generalize the logic behind the result of
Carlsson and van Damme (1993).
Many researchers have applied this technique to solve equilibrium indeterminacy
in the important economic situations we mentioned above. For example, Burdzy et
al. (2001), and Frankel and Pauzner (2000) apply this technique in dynamic settings.
Goldstein and Pauzner (1999) apply it to bank runs and Goldstein (1999) to banking
and currency crises. Heinemann (2000), Heinemann and Illing (2002), and Morris
1Cooper and John (1988) show that many of these models share the feature that there are spillovers be-
tween different players’ strategies. These spillovers create strategic complementarities, which often cause
a multiplicity of equilibria.
2Most newspaper accounts of the recent currency crisis (with an added bank run element) in Argentina
focus on fundamental factors rather than on sunspots.
3Other related examples can be found in Myerson (1991, p. 66) or Binmore (1992, p. 445).
4These games have two Nash equlibria in pure strategies, and one mixed-strategy equilibrium.
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and Shin (1998) deal with speculative attacks. Morris et al. (1995a) study bubbles,
and Shin (1996) asset trading.
Despite their theoretical and practical attractiveness, these ideas face some poten-
tial empirical difficulties. The logic of the result requires that players do many rounds
of deletion of dominated strategies, each of which requires sophisticated Bayesian
reasoning. It is well-known that real-life players are not particularly good at perform-
ing either of these tasks. Sefton and Yavas¸ (1996), for example, study experimentally
a game that is derived from a coordination game. The unique solution of the trans-
formed game, which also involves many rounds of deletion of strictly dominated
strategies, is not the most-observed experimental outcome.5 More generally, experi-
ments have shown that subjects apply low levels of reasoning (Stahl and Wilson 1995;
Nagel 1995; Costa-Gomes et al. 2001; Costa-Gomes and Crawford 2002).
In this paper, we conduct an experimental test of a game inspired by Carlsson and
van Damme (1993). In the baseline treatment under incomplete information, we find
that the theoretical solution is the most frequent outcome after 50 periods. Further-
more, the frequency of strictly dominated actions, whose optimality does not require
assumptions about other agents’ rationality, decreases quickly. For actions that are
optimal only if other (dominated) actions are played infrequently, the frequency of
play decreased at a slower speed. However, our subjects clearly do not arrive at the
solution by careful introspection,6 but rather adapt their play in response to their ob-
servations about the other players’ behavior. When we repeat the game with common
knowledge about the state of the world, the observed behavior converges sometimes
to the payoff-dominant equilibrium.
To test the hypothesis that learning is the explanation for our results, we ran a
different treatment, inspired by the work of Battalio et al. (2001) who analyze ex-
perimentally coordination games with complete information. In the new treatment,
the basins of attraction of the equilibria in the underlying complete information game
are identical to those in the baseline treatment, but the difference of payoffs between
different strategies is lower (the optimization premium in the language of Battalio et
al. 2001). Indeed, in the second treatment, the behavior in the lab did not converge
to the unique equilibrium of the incomplete information game after 50 periods in
some of the sessions, neither with complete nor with incomplete information about
the state of the world. Our results are even more surprising than those of Battalio et
al. (2001), since there is a unique equilibrium in the incomplete information version
of our game.
We also performed simulations of the agents’ behavior using the experience-
weighted attraction learning model of Camerer and Ho (1999) for the two treat-
5In a betting game by Sonsino et al. (1999) and Søvik (2000), which is also solved by iterated deletion
of strictly dominated strategies, the empirical solution does not coincide with the theoretical solution. It is
possible, though, that the number of periods was not enough for equilibrium convergence, as the trend in
her data suggests.
6Both their actions and their responses in the comments sheets suggest that they do not grasp the subtle
Bayesian issues involved. Charness and Levin (2005) show that when Bayesian updating and reinforce-
ment learning yield the same predictions, most subjects behave in accordance with the theory. However,
when Bayesian-updating and reinforcement learning point into different directions, less than half of the
subjects use Bayesian updating correctly.
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Table 1 The 2 × 2 game, the true values, signals, conditional probabilities and expected utilities
True value X 90 80 70 60 50
Signal S T U T U W U W Y W Y Z Y Z
P(X) 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5
P(S|X) 1/2 1/2 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/2 1/2
ments.7 The simulations have a qualitatively good fit with the experimental results,
which further strengthens the evidence in favor of the hypothesis that learning is the
explanation of behavior in this game.8
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in Sect. 2 we discuss theoret-
ically the game that is played by the experimental subjects. Section 3 describes the
experimental design. Section 4 collects the experimental results, Sect. 5 discusses the
related experimental literature, and Sect. 6 concludes.
2 The game
2.1 Incomplete information games
(a) In the baseline treatment, the experimental subjects face an incomplete informa-
tion game in which there are 2 players, each of whom has 2 actions, A and B. The
payoffs for each action profile are given in the following matrix
A B
A X,X X,0
B 0,X 80,80
The random variable X can take 5 possible values, 90, 80, 70, 60 and 50 (row
1 in Table 1). Each of these variables have the same probability p = 1/5 (row 3 of
Table 1). The players do not know the value of X, but independently receive a private
signal about the value of X. The signals Si can be: T, U, W, Y, Z. The relationship
between signals S and the value of X are shown in row 1 and 2 of Table 1, e.g. if the
true value is 90, then the signal can be only T or U or if the signal is T, the true value
can be only 90, or 80. The conditional probabilities P(S|X) are shown in row 4. The
strategy for all players is a function from the set of signals to the set of actions.
Proposition 1 The only strategy in this game that survives the iterated deletion of
strictly dominated strategies is to play action A irrespective of the signal received.
7Available at: http://www.eco.uc3m.es/acabrales/research/pdf/cabnagelarmfinal.pdf
8Camerer and Chong (2002) provide parameter estimates for several learning models using our data for
game 1 with incomplete information.
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Proof For complete proof, see Appendix A in the working paper version of this pa-
per.9
Let us give some intuition here. The proof is done in four steps of iterated reason-
ing.
Step 1 (elimination of strictly dominated strategy): A rational player with signal T
or U will never play B, since the expected utility of action A is greater than that of
action B, irrespective of what a player with signal W or Y does.
Step 2 Knowing that a player with signal T or U will play A, a rational player with
signal W will never play B, irrespective of what a player with signal W, Y, or Z does.
Step 3 Knowing that players with signal T, U, or W will never play B, a rational
player with signal Y will never play B, irrespective of what a player with signal Y or
Z does.
Step 4 Knowing that players with signal T, U, W, or Y will never play B, a rational
player with signal Z will never play B, irrespective of what a player with signal Z
does. 
The signal received by the agents in Carlsson and van Damme (1993) is distributed
continuously in a small interval around the value of X. We chose to modify the game
in order to make the theoretical reasoning simpler. In particular, one can see in the
proof of the proposition that the equilibrium can be reached after only four rounds of
deletion of dominated strategies. Even so, the task still seems to be challenging.
It is also worth noting that the proposition assumes that the figures in the payoff
matrix are Von Neumann–Morgenstern utilities. However, we do not control for risk
preferences in the laboratory. It is not difficult to see that, if agents are risk loving,
one can find other equilibria in this game in which an action is signal dependent.
We could have tried to control for risk preferences, but Selten et al. (1999) have cast
some doubts on procedures to control for risk aversion. Our results can be better
explained by assuming that some agents are mildly risk loving and do not have a
good assessment of play probabilities at the beginning of the game.
(b) For the alternative control treatment, the payoffs are
A B
A X,X R,0
B 0,R 80,80
The payoffs for B remain the same as in the baseline treatment (0 and 80, respec-
tively). The pair of random variables (X,R) can take 5 possible values (36, 84), (32,
80), (28, 76), (24, 72) and (20, 68). The information structure is the same as in the
baseline treatment. Each of these pairs of variables has the same probability p = 1/5.
The players do not know the value of (X,R), but independently receive a private
signal about the value of (X,R), and the signals Si can be: T, U, W, Y, or Z.
In Fig. 1 we can see the difference in payoffs between strategy A and B as
a function of the mixed-strategy of an opponent. We plot this (for the complete-
information analog of the game) with X = 50 in the baseline treatment (high), and
9Available at: http://www.econ.upf.edu/docs/papers/downloads/601.pdf
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Fig. 1 Expected payoff
difference between strategies A
and B in the complete
information games (full line:
C-base for X = 50, broken line:
C-control for
(X,R) = (20,68)), for different
probabilities of an A choice by
the opponent
for (X,R) = (20,68) in the alternative control treatment (low). This figure will be
useful in the following discussion.
Our alternative treatment was inspired by the work of Battalio et al. (2001), who
did experiments with two (sets of) complete-information coordination games. Both
games had identical structures in terms of the sizes of the basins of attractions,10
but in each set of games the depth of the basin of attraction was different. For a
given equilibrium strategy pair, this depth is the difference in payoffs between the
equilibrium strategy and the alternative.11 This difference determines the strength of
the incentives to choose a best-response. Battalio et al. (2001) showed that in one
of the games the behavior in the laboratory always converges to the risk-dominant
equilibrium, but in the alternative game, the behavior sometimes converges to the
payoff-dominant equilibrium. They explain this phenomenon by resorting to learning
dynamics.
As we show in Proposition 2, the new treatment has the same equilibrium struc-
ture as the baseline one. There is still a unique strategy profile that survives the it-
erated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. But, given the results of Battalio et
al. (2001), one would expect markedly different behavior in the two treatments if our
results are a consequence of learning. Indeed, we would like to interpret the presence
or absence of different convergence behavior in both treatments as a “test” of the
learning explanation for our results.
Proposition 2 The only strategy in the alternative game that survives the iterated
deletion of strictly dominated strategies is to play action A irrespective of the signal
received.
Proof See Appendix A in the working paper version of this paper.12 
10In this kind of game, the “basin of attraction” of an equilibrium is the set of mixed-strategy profiles for
which it is a best-response for both players to play the equilibrium strategy. Its “size” is the area of that
set. In Fig. 1 this is represented by the length of the segments of the horizontal axis to the right and left of
its intersection with the payoff-difference function.
11As the game is symmetric, this difference is the same for both players. The depth in Fig. 1 is the vertical
distance to the payoff-difference function at 0 and 1.
12Available at: http://www.econ.upf.edu/docs/papers/downloads/601.pdf
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2.2 Complete information games
For both payoff structures (control and alternative treatments) we also ran exper-
iments with closely related complete information games. That is, the exact pay-
offs were given and this was common knowledge. Therefore, in the baseline treat-
ment we have 5 possible games (randomly chosen in each period) with payoffs for
X = {50,60,70,80,90}.
• If X = 90, the strategy combination AA is a unique equilibrium which is Pareto
optimal and in dominant strategies.
• For X = 80, 70, 60, or 50, the strategy combinations AA and BB are the two pure-
strategy equilibria.
Similarly, for the alternative treatment, we have 5 possible games, with the possi-
ble realizations for (X,R) being (36, 84), (32, 80), (28, 76), (24, 72) or (20, 68). For
the first realization there exists only one equilibrium in dominant strategies, AA. In
the other four games there are two pure equilibria: AA or BB. We do not consider
mixed equilibria.
3 Experimental design
The experiments were run with undergraduates of all faculties in the Leex (Laboratori
d’economia experimental) of the Universitat Pompeu Fabra. No subject could partici-
pate in more than one session. Upon arrival, students were randomly assigned to their
seats. One of the instructors read the instructions (see Appendix B in the working pa-
per version of this paper13) aloud and questions were answered in private. Sessions
lasted about 1 hour including the reading of the instructions. All sessions presented
here were run by computer using z-tree tools.
We present in this paper a 2 × 2 design of treatments as shown in the next table
(in parentheses is the name we refer to later in the text).
Complete info (C) Incomplete info (IC)
High optimization premium
(baseline)
3 sessions with two inde-
pendent groups in each ses-
sion (C-base called complete
game 1)
2 sessions with two inde-
pendent groups in each ses-
sion (IC-base called incom-
plete game 1)
Low optimization premium
(control)
2 sessions with two inde-
pendent groups in each ses-
sion (C-control called com-
plete game 2)
4 sessions with two indepen-
dent groups in each session
(IC-control called incomplete
game 2)
Each session consisted of 16 subjects, which were divided into 2 independent
subgroups of 8 subjects. In this way, we obtain two independent observations for
13Available at: http://www.econ.upf.edu/docs/papers/downloads/601.pdf
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each session. Each subject was randomly matched with an opponent in each round.
In the instructions we state that subjects are randomly matched, though they don’t
know that there are two subgroups.
Each session consisted of 50 rounds.14 In each round, a true value out of the five
possible values (X being 50, 60, 70, 80 or 90 for the baseline and (X,R) being (36,
84), (32, 80), (28, 76), (24, 72) and (20, 68) for the control treatment) was drawn
randomly and independently for each pair. In the complete information game, the
players in a pair were informed about the true value. In the incomplete information
treatment, subjects were not informed of the true value, but instead each subject re-
ceived an independent signal depending on the true value. The relationship between
the value X and the signal as shown to the subjects is given in the first two rows in
Table 1 for the baseline treatment. A similar table was given for the alternative treat-
ment (see instructions). In the instructions, we mentioned the probabilities of 20% for
each value X (X,R). Furthermore, we stated that each possible signal for a given X
(X,R) had equal probability without specifying these probabilities. We did not state
probabilities of X (X,R) conditional on these signals. We informed the players that
the signal for each player was independently drawn from the same distribution. We
emphasized several times that the underlying variable X (X,R) was the same within
a pair but the signal could be different.
After each period, each player was informed about the choice of the other player
and both players’ payoffs. In the incomplete information treatments, he received the
information about the true value of X (X,R). The signal of the other player was never
revealed.
4 Experimental results
The main objective of this study is to test experimentally the effect of the introduc-
tion of payoff uncertainty in a coordination game. With this general goal in mind, we
first compare the behavior in complete and incomplete information games. Second,
we also observe the differences in behavior, or in speed of convergence to a par-
ticular behavior, after different signals when information is incomplete. The reason
for this interest is that different levels of reasoning (rounds of deletion of dominated
strategies) are required to compute the equilibrium behavior after different signals.
Finally, we compare behavior between the baseline and control treatments in order to
test whether convergence to the unique equilibrium depends on the payoff difference
between the equilibrium strategy and the alternative strategy (that is, on the depth of
the basin of attraction).
14Initially, we started with hand-run experiments of 15 rounds of the baseline treatment with incomplete
information and one complete information game, in which X is always restricted to 50, that is the lowest
value of all possible Xs in the incomplete information treatments. The lowest value of X was chosen,
since the signals of that value most likely induced a B choice in the uncertainty treatment. Since the
behavior did not converge, neither with incomplete nor with complete information, we extended the rounds
to 50. The results of the 15 period sessions can be found in the working paper version. Available at:
http://www.econ.upf.edu/docs/papers/downloads/601.pdf and they are similar to the first 15 periods in the
50 period sessions.
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Fig. 2 Relative frequency of
B-play given signal/state in each
treatment
In Fig. 2, we show the relative frequencies of B choices pooled over all rounds con-
ditional on each possible signal/state separately for each treatment. Clearly, the lower
the signal/state, the higher the relative frequency with which B is chosen within a
treatment: only in 4 out of 22 independent observations do we observe fewer B-
choices for a lower signal or state than for a higher signal or state. Thus, the null
hypothesis of equal B-frequencies for all signal/states can be rejected in favor of the
alternative hypothesis that a lower signal/state triggers more B-play than a higher sig-
nal/state at the 0.2% level, (z = −2.98) using a one-sided binominal test. For signal
or state T, B-play amounts to 4.1% for C-base, 5% for IC-base, 21% for C-control
and 17% for IC-control. There is no difference in frequency of B-play for the T sig-
nal between the complete or incomplete versions within the same game. The relative
frequencies for B-play given T or U (strictly dominated strategies) are similar as in
other studies on iterated reasoning (see e.g. Søvik 2000). With signal or state Z, B-
play amounts to 62% for C-base, 33% for IC-base15 and 71% for C-control and 73%
for IC-control.
The dynamics of behavior over time is shown in Figs. 3a–d. Here we separate the
relative frequency of B-choices in 5 period blocks for each possible signal, pooled
over all sessions per treatment. Subjects learn to avoid a B choice given a signal T
or U in all treatments, though convergence is much slower in the control treatment.
Only in IC-base does a signal Z trigger almost all A-play (on average 12%) in the final
periods. In (both of) the control treatments and the C-base treatment, for signals or
states Z and Y there is no convergence on average across sessions to playing A within
50 periods. In the IC-control game there is high dispersion of behavior over time for
the Z-signal. In 4 out of the 8 groups of independent observations there is convergence
to the risk dominant equilibrium, while in 2 there is convergence to all B-play and
in the remaining two it is 60% and 66% B-play. Under complete information in both
games, 2 out of 10 groups converge to the risk dominant equilibrium when the worst
state is chosen (Z-state), while in the remaining groups B-play amounts to 77%. If
we compare the frequency of B-play for the first 5 periods for signal/state Z between
the complete and incomplete information treatments within the same game, there is
no significant difference at the 10% level (U = 15.5 game 1; U = 24 game 2) using
the Mann–Whitney U test. This holds true also for the two control treatments in the
15This difference in frequency of B-play between C-base and IC-base is significant at the 10% (U = 19),
using the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney U-test.
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Fig. 3 Relative frequency of B-play over time, separately for each signal/state and treatment
last five periods (U = 20). However, the frequency of B-play is significantly (at the
5% level, U = 20.5) larger in the C-base than in the IC-base treatment.
To sum up: For signals or states T and U with “high” expected value of choice A
(or low level of reasoning in incomplete information games) subjects quickly learn
to avoid the B-choice in all treatments. However, only in the IC-base do players learn
to play the A-choice for low states, and thus achieve the global game equilibrium as
proposed by Carlsson and van Damme, which takes about 30 periods. Do subjects ap-
ply the concept of iterated elimination of dominated strategies? The comments give
no indication that they do. Rather, it seems that they learn to avoid B-choices when
they receive zero payoffs. This is already conjectured in Carlsson and van Damme
(1993).16 In the working paper version,17 we explore more thoroughly whether learn-
ing is a good explanation for the observed behavior and the driving force for such a
learning process.
16Carlsson and van Damme (1993) say: “This [common knowledge of rationality] justification of our
solution concept, however, may not be totally convincing since a major motivation for our approach has
been the wish to relax the common knowledge assumption. Hence it would be desirable to find alternative
justifications which [. . .] dispense with it altogether. The kind of stories that naturally come to one’s mind
are those were the strategy choices, instead of being determined by strictly rational considerations, result
from some learning or evolutionary process.”
17Available at: http://www.eco.uc3m.es/acabrales/research/pdf/cabnagelarmfinal.pdf
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5 Related experimental literature
There are only a few papers which test or refer to the theory of global games in the
experimental literature. Heinemann et al. (2004) is the one most closely related to
ours. These authors depart from the model of currency crises of Obstfeld (1996) and
Morris and Shin (1998). Like us, Heinamann et al. (2004) also find a small, but signif-
icant, difference in behavior between complete and incomplete information games,
with the equilibrium of the incomplete information game describing the observed
behavior well.
There are several differences in the design and behavior of our paper and Heine-
mann et al. (2004). In the experiment we report here, the subjects play a 2 person
game with changing opponents, and signals are taken from a discrete distribution. In
Heinemann et al. (2004), the subjects repeatedly play a 15 player game, and signals
are drawn from a uniform distribution. The advantage of a discrete distribution is that
the equilibrium can be computed through a limited (and low) number of rounds of
deletion of strictly dominated strategies. Furthermore, in our case the equilibrium out-
come coincides on average with the risk dominant equilibrium of a related complete
information game. In Heinemann et al. (2004) the unique equilibrium lies in between
the risk dominant and Pareto dominant equilibria of the related complete information
game. In Heinemann et al. (2004), the observed behavior does not change much over
time, and is essentially explained by the initial choices, which are close to the global
game solution. In our paper, on the other hand, behavior changes significantly over
time and it can be well-explained by learning dynamics.
Having two players and a discrete signal space instead of many players and a
continuous signal space allows us to better understand the determinants of behavior,
and the influence of learning becomes much clearer. In this way, it becomes easy
to know under which conditions convergence will become much slower (thus, for
practical purposes, failing to occur). We can thus construct a control treatment where
equilibrium behavior is shown empirically to be much harder to achieve.
Cornand (2006) extends the paper by Heinemann et al. (2004) by introducing a
public signal in addition to the private signal and a treatment in which the agents re-
ceive two public signals. She finds that players rely more on the public signal than the
private signal. The main implication is that a central bank should disclose a common
signal if the agents have a private signal in order to decrease the probability of attack
and the incidence of coordination failure.
Heinemann et al. (2007) analyze behavior in coordination games with complete in-
formation. They show that the global game equilibrium of the complete information
game is a good description of the behavior in that game. As a consequence, it is also a
good recommendation for playing the game. Cheung and Friedman (2005) test specu-
lative attack models with continuous time, size asymmetries, and varying amounts of
public information. Costain et al. (2005) report bimodal outcomes in sequential move
coordination games with complete and incomplete information, as predicted by the
model in Costain (2004). Brunnermeier and Morgan (2004) study “clock games” that
end when the third of six players exits, and the first three players receive a payoff that
increases continuously in the exit time. Consistent with the unique symmetric pure
strategy Nash equilibrium, players exit sooner when they have better information
about other players’ choices and clock settings.
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6 Discussion
In this paper, we have tested experimentally the theoretical predictions of the model
in Carlsson and van Damme (1993). Rubinstein (1989) analyzes a related game pre-
cisely to demonstrate that common knowledge predictions may not be robust because
they require too much rationality from the agents.18 He argues that the theoretical
prediction for his e-mail game would not hold in real-life.
Our results show that Rubinstein’s (1989) conjecture was partly right. The theoret-
ical results of Carlsson and van Damme (1993) do not hold under all circumstances.
They certainly do not hold for players without experience in the game, and in some
cases even after a relatively long experience. More interestingly, we have systematic
evidence for when they are more likely to hold. When the strength of incentives (the
optimization premium in the language of Battalio et al. 2001) is high (baseline), we
are more likely to observe convergence to the theoretically predicted outcome. The
Battalio et al. (2001) results, which inspired our alternative treatment, are suggested
by learning theories. We have performed simulations of learning models with our
game which indicate that learning is indeed a good candidate to explain our results.
We also find that the complete information version of the game presents features
quite similar to those of the game with incomplete information (less so, but still
remarkable, in the baseline treatment). It is thus plausible to think that that risk-
dominance plays an important role in the result. One could perhaps interpret this
similarity between complete and incomplete information as saying that the “control-
lable” part of incomplete information is not the only thing that explains the results.
There may be a more fundamental lack of common knowledge about preferences,
which, despite our efforts cannot really be controlled (degree of risk aversion, pref-
erence for “fairness” and so on). And even with common knowledge of preferences,
there could still be lack of common knowledge about the equilibrium, which is why
Harsanyi et al. (1988) introduced risk dominance. In their words: “risk dominance
is important only in those situations where the players would be initially uncertain
whether the other players would choose one or the other equilibrium.”
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